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1. Introduction
In his 1949 essay “The Land Ethic,” Aldo Leopold1  famously stated:
“A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of 
the biotic community.  It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (emphasis added).
Thus, the land ethic made the biotic community a locus of direct moral obligation.  But 
what did Leopold mean by “biotic community”?  Interestingly, it included abiotic 
components: “soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.”  So, “biotic 
community” is a misleading term; land community, another term that Leopold employs 
in “The Land Ethic,” seems more appropriate.
Leopold’s biotic/land community is somewhat unusual in another respect:
(i) it emphasizes the interdependence among organisms and abiotic components 
(ii) it emphasizes matter and energy flow through organisms and abiotic components. 
Concerning (i): Interdependence (causal relations, causal interactions) among organisms 
is generally associated with the concept of community and with community ecology.
Concerning (ii): Matter/energy flow through organisms and abiotic components is 
generally associated with the concept of ecosystem and with ecosystem ecology.
So, Leopold’s “land community” combines aspects of the concept of “community” as it 
is more typically conceived with aspects of the concept of “ecosystem” as it is more 
typically conceived.
Two questions arise:
1. Is the concept of an integrated community-ecosystem “land community” 
hopelessly outdated or misguided?  Does any contemporary work support such 
an entity?
2. If the concept of a “land community” can be defended, is it coherent enough to 
be a locus of direct moral obligation? (Some have argued that it is not). Is it an 
1
1 Leopold was a 20th century forester, game/wildlife manager, and professor. He has been very 
influential in environmental ethics and conservation biology.
individual?2  
My ultimate goal is to see if there is a defensible concept of “land community” that is as 
close to Leopold’s own as possible (rather than, say, simply substitute any ecosystem 
concept and think that we’ve tested the land ethic).  But this is too much to fully achieve 
today; here, I will mainly just sketch the landscape a bit and offer a tentative suggestion 
for how to understand “land community” at the end.
2. Early community and ecosystem concepts
First, I offer a (very) potted timeline of central figures in the development of community 
and ecosystem concepts, with an eye toward a Leopoldean land community:3
• Frederic Clements (1916):  Clements characterized multispecies groupings as  
communities.  He is known for thinking of communities as organisms, but see Eliot 
(2011) on this point; he has given us reason to think that Clements’ commitments 
to communities as organisms has been overstated.  Regardless, there are traces of 
thinking of communities as organisms in Leopold (Callicott 1996, 358).
• Charles Elton (1927): Leopold derived his concept of community as a close knit 
group that is interdependent and not a mere assemblage from Elton, not to 
mention food chains and the land pyramid. The parallels between the two are 
obvious and striking.
• Alfred Tansley (1935):  Tansley is generally credited with the ecosystem concept; he 
rejected the community concept altogether. Interesting, it appears that Leopold 
included abiotic components and energy flow independently of (and perhaps prior 
to) Tansley (see Appendix A). 
• Raymond Lindeman (1942): Lindeman was a key developer of the ecosystem 
concept – but for him, trophic or “energy-availing” relationships occur within the 
community.  He thought that discrimination between living organisms and their 
environment is “arbitrary and unnatural.”
• Eugene Odum (1971): Like Lindeman, Odum included a community of interacting 
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2 See Odenbaugh (2007, 2010) and Eliot (2011, 2013) for discussion of communities and ecosystems as 
individuals.  These accounts leave open the question of whether of whether the two can be combined and 
whether the combination would be an individual.
3 There is a marginally less potted timeline in Appendix A.
organisms leading to a flow of energy in his ecosystem concept. Perhaps not by 
accident; he was influenced by Leopold and cited Leopold explicitly.
So, Odum’s and Lindeman’s ecosystem ideas, by incorporating community elements, are 
actually very much in line with the idea of a Leopoldean land community and could 
thus potentially be used to flesh out Leopold’s concept.
But a lot has changed since 1971, flagged by Donald Worster’s (1990) critique of Odum’s 
(and Clements’s) notion that nature moves toward order and harmony:
“Ecology is not the same as it was. A rather drastic change has been going on in 
this science of late-a radical shifting away from the thinking of Eugene Odum's 
generation, away from its assumptions of order and predictability, a shifting 
toward what we might call a new ecology of chaos” (Worster 1990).4
So, are there contemporary candidates for a land community that lack such assumptions 
while combining community and ecosystem elements?  
3. Contemporary community-ecosystem concepts
The short answer is “yes”:  O’Neill (2001), Post et al. (2007), Chapin et al (2011), Schulze 
et al. (2005), Hastings and Gross (2012).5  All of these ecologists combine community 
and ecosystem elements in describing the entities that they study.
Here are some important and useful insights that can be drawn from these authors.
• The “matter/energy flow”-alone approach creates problems – and so does the 
“population interaction”-alone approach (O’Neill 2001, Post et al. 2007).
• Sustainability, rather than stability, may be the relevant property (O’Neill 2001).
• What an ecosystem is may be different from its models (Hastings and Gross 2012).
• Some purported boundaries may exclude relevant processes (Schulze et al. 2005).
• Boundaries are set by discontinuities or steep gradients in the flux and flow of 
3
4 I don’t fully accept Worster’s characterization of contemporary ecology, but I will grant it for the 
purposes of this paper.
5 See Appendix B for a slightly longer answer.
material and energy and/or by discontinuities or steep gradients in interactions 
between populations of different species (Post et al. 2007). 
4. Potential problems with a combined community-ecosystem concept
But there are some potential problems with a combined community-ecosystem 
approach.  Consider that some systems are well-bounded while others are open (Post et al. 
2007).
In well-bounded systems (e.g., lakes, 
islands) these two approaches coincide – 
and coincide with physical boundaries 
as well – making delineating ecosystem 
boundaries relatively straightforward.  
In such systems, “...interactions among 
organisms are typically stronger and 
cycling of material and energy is 
typically tighter within than across the 
physical boundaries of these 
ecosystems.”   On the other hand, in open systems (e.g., most terrestrial habitats, 
estuaries, and streams), the two approaches do not coincide, e.g., if resources come from 
areas where species are not interacting (e.g., upstream).   The problem, then, is how to 
handle open systems.
Post et al. (2007) describe various scenarios.  Suppose, for example, large “inputs” are 
coming from the “outside” at short temporal scales.6 Then we should recognize that the 
system is larger than we had initially thought.  Alternatively, suppose (as is common in 
watersheds and streams) that “internal” cycling of material/energy is stronger than 
“external” inputs. Then we should consider “internal” cycling to dictate the boundary.
Post et al. conclude: “In open ecosystems where there is little or no congruence among 
physical and functional boundaries... each different question may dictate very different 
definitions of ecosystem boundaries.”  However, I have a bit of trouble seeing how this 
conclusion follows; I think I may be missing something in their argument.
Until I figure that out, here are some questions I see arising in light of  Post et al.’s 
proposals:  1) Have they really made the case for needing multiple ways to delineate 
4
6 O’Neill et al. (1986) imagine a similar situation, but where the community is more extensive than the 
matter/energy flows.
ecosystem boundaries?  Their examples don’t seem to support it (as far as I can tell).  2) 
Are open systems where different questions dictate different ecosystem definitions and 
different ecosystem boundaries coherent enough to be entities that we owe direct 
obligations to?  That might not be a problem for Post et al., but it could be a problem for 
a land ethic. 3) Would it even be wise to try to treat purported land communities well 
while failing to consider some of the population interactions or energy flows relevant to 
their sustainability? It seems as though one would run into practical problems if one did 
so.  Which leads me to consider the fourth challenge: 4) Are there other ways that 
boundaries of open systems can be delineated?
There seem to be (at least) three ways of handling open systems, systems where the 
spatial area of the densely interacting populations is larger than that of the dense 
matter/energy flow – or vice versa:  
1. The land community exists within the 
larger of the two areas.  
Possible problem: We lose the 
concept of the ecosystem as a focal 
level, going beyond locales that lend 
themselves to concrete study in the 
field – perhaps to biomes (Currie 
2011).
2. The land community exists within the 
smaller of the two areas.  
Possible problem:  We might exclude causally relevant factors for the future states 
of populations and abiotic components and thus give a misleading picture that 
would be subject to error.
3. The land community includes interactions or matter/energy flows from the larger area if 
and only if those interactions are stronger or larger than those of the smaller area.
Possible problem:  None seen at the moment.  This is the way that I am leaning.
5. Toward a Leopoldean Land Community Concept
Insights from the ecologists discussed in sections 3 and 4 lead me to a (very tentative) 
proposal:
A Leopoldean land community consists of populations of different species interacting 
with each other and with their abiotic environment, creating interdependencies between 
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organisms; these survival-relevant interactions produce a flow of energy and materials 
between biotic components and between biotic components and abiotic components.  
Survival-relevant interactions between the populations include: Competition for scarce 
resources, predator/prey, parasite/host, pollinator/pollinated, provision of shade or 
shelter.  Relevant flows of materials and energy include: primary production 
(photosynthesis, chemosynthesis), secondary production, evapotranspiration, 
decomposition, nutrient cycling.  Food webs are of particular importance to a land 
community because they can represent species interactions within a community and 
energy flow through those species (Post et al. 2007).
Land community boundaries7 for well-bounded systems are where discontinuities or steep 
gradients in the flow of material and energy coincide with discontinuities or steep 
gradients in species interactions. Land community boundaries for open systems are at a 
minimum delineated by the smaller of the two types of discontinuities or steep 
gradients, including the more extensive interactions or matter/energy flows if and only if 
those interactions or matter/energy flows are stronger or larger than those of the 
smaller area. This approach has the advantage of including all significant causally 
relevant factors for the future states of populations and abiotic components 
(interdependencies).  It may mean that there are fewer land communities than one 
might have thought; however, I am not sure that this is a problem. Ecologists may 
reasonably choose to study subsets (including particular types of interactions or 
particular matter or energy flows) of these for various pragmatic reasons, but such 
choices do not affect the ontology of land communities.
The composition of species in a land community may change over time; it is the same 
entity if and only if there is continuity of interaction and material/energy flow through 
time.8  Thus, land communities may or may not be stable in the sense of “stasis” or 
“equilibrium.”  Sustainability (similar to what Leopold meant by stability or land health 
– see Newton 2006) is a more pertinent trait or feature (O’Neill 2001).  For example, 
Leopold (1943) traced four epochs within Southwestern Wisconsin,9 but his concern is 
land health in the face of different practices, not change of species.
A land community so described would be an individual in the Ghiselin-Hull sense 
6
7 Note that land community boundaries are fuzzy rather than sharp.
8 See also Odenbaugh (2007) on this point.
9 Fur trade epoch, 1680-1832; Fire epoch, 1750-1850; Wheat epoch, 1832-1878; Dairy epoch, 1872-(his) 
present
(see, e.g., Ghiselin 1974, 1997; Hull 1976, 1978, 1980)10; it would:
• Be a particular thing, not a class; it would be a spatiotemporally restricted entity 
• Not merely be an assemblage;11 it would be an integrated, cohesive entity because 
of the causal interactions among the parts, giving the parts (to some extent) a 
shared fate.  (This is the most important criterion, in my view)
• Have beginnings and endings in time.
• Be continuous through time, allowing for change over time.
On this view, individuality comes in degrees, especially with respect to integration, 
eliminating the need for a separate term for “wholes” (see Odenbaugh 2007); here I set 
aside the question of whether the land community is an organism, which brings 
additional complications.
6. Conclusions
Although there are further issues to be worked out,12 there is some reason to think that a 
Leopoldean concept of a land community is consistent with some contemporary 
ecology. There is also reason to think that were any such entity to exist in the world, it 
would be an individual.  If this is correct, then a Leopoldean land community is at least 
a candidate for direct moral obligation.
Acknowledgements: Thanks to Christopher Hunter Lean and Alkistis Elliott-Graves for 
organizing our session, and to Chris Eliot for many helpful conversations about 
communities and ecosystems.
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10 See also Millstein (2009).
11 Contra the so-called “Gleasonian” picture.
12 See Appendix C
Appendix A: Early community and ecosystem concepts13 
Frederic Clements (1916):  
• See Chris Eliot’s “The Legend of Order and Chaos.”  
• Community as organism?  
J. Baird Callicott argues that there are “residual traces of the early twentieth-century 
Clementsian super-organism paradigm” in Leopold’s land ethic (Callicott 1996, 358).
Charles Elton (1927):
• plant and animals are not mere assemblages of species living together, but form 
closely-knit communities comparable to our own (and which include humans). 
• Relations between animals are largely food relations, giving rise to food chains, the 
food-cycle, and the “pyramid of numbers” 
Note: Leopold met Elton in 1931 (Meine 2010) and was very influenced by him, not only 
in terms of Elton’s concept of community but also food chains and pyramid of numbers 
(what Leopold called the “land pyramid”).
Alfred Tansley (1935):  (generally credited with ecosystem concept) 
• Plants and animals are too different to be considered part of the same community
• Biomes (sensu Clements), “the whole webs of life adjusted to particular complexes 
of environmental factors,” are real ‘wholes,’ often highly integrated.  
• But biomes are not organisms.
• Rather, biomes together with all of the physical factors involved are systems 
(ecosystems); this is the more fundamental conception.
According to Betty Craige (2002) and Callicott (2014), Leopold anticipated many of 
Tansley’s ideas of an ecosystem (in essays written in 1933 and 1939 essays, respectively).
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13 The three appendices represent slides that I prepared for the talk, but had to cut in the interests of time.  
I kept them at the ready in case they became relevant during the Q and A.
So, Leopold may not be in a Tansleyean tradition, even those there are similarities.  
Raymond Lindeman (1942): (a key developer of the ecosystem concept)
“The trophic-dynamic viewpoint emphasizes the relationship of trophic or 
‘energy-availing’ relationships within the community-unit to the process of 
succession.  
The discrimination between living organisms as parts of the ‘biotic community’ 
and dead organisms and inorganic nutritives as parts of the ‘environment’ seems 
arbitrary and unnatural.”
(emphasis added)
The point here is that even though Lindeman is seen as a key developer of the 
ecosystem concept, the community concept is still a core part of that idea.
Eugene Odum (1971): 
“An ecosystem is any unit that includes all of the organisms (i.e., the 
‘community’) in a given area interacting with the physical environment so that a 
flow of energy leads to clearly defined trophic structure, biotic diversity, and 
material cycles (i.e., exchange of materials between living and nonliving parts) 
within the system.”
• There still seems to be a strong community component to Odum’s ecosystem 
concept.
• Craige sees Odum as having been influenced by Leopold (among others), and 
Odum cites Leopold explicitly.  
The point here is that Odum, perhaps as an intellectual descendant of Leopold, provides 
a good candidate for a land community concept that incorporates both interdependence 
between organisms as well as energy flow. 
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Appendix B: Contemporary community-ecosystem concepts 
Robert O’Neill (2001):
• Points out that while various problems can be solved by viewing an ecosystem 
purely in terms of functional groups that recover to the same rate processes, 
feedbacks, and complex organization (e.g., species moving in and out of an area 
over time), such an approach creates its own problems (e.g., failure to recognize 
ecotones and also minimizes the role of natural selection).
• Argues that we must recognize the simple empirical fact that ecosystems are 
collections of interacting populations, with component populations shaped by 
natural selection.  Suggests that the resulting biotic potential determines ecosystem 
dynamics just as much as chemical and physical constraints.
• Maintains that the critical property of an ecosystem is not stability, but rather the 
ability to change state in response to a continuous spectrum of change and 
variability (sustainability).
Schulze et al. (2011): 
• Ecosystems are networks of interrelations between organisms and their 
environment in a defined space.
• The interactions are “far away” from equilibrium and there is no goal for certain 
dynamic change.
• The of an ecosystem must, clearly, extend so far that the essential parts of material 
turnover per ground area (e.g., carbon assimilation, nitrogen mineralisation, 
formation of ground water, etc.) are taken into account quantitatively.
• For example, a rotting tree trunk is only a partial system within a forest
This suggests that there can be mistaken ways of characterizing the boundaries of an 
ecosystem.  More on that later.
Hastings and Gross (2012): 
• ecosystem - A system composed of both the organisms (animal, plant, microbe) 
and the abiotic environment, and all interactions among and between these 
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components.  
• ecosystem model - A model designed to capture the pools and fluxes of mass (and 
sometimes energy) in an ecosystem. Ecosystem models use carbon as their basic 
currency, but most also track the biogeochemical cycles of water and 
macronutrients 
This nicely separates what an ecosystem is from the particular aspects of an ecosystem 
(flow of materials and energy) that an ecologist might study.
11
Appendix C: Issues to work on 
• What makes interactions such as predator/prey interactions population-level 
rather than organism-level?  Does it matter?
• Is there a general way to specify these interactions?  “Ecological” or “biotic” seem 
vague (Eliot criticizes Odenbaugh on this point).  Right now I have them 
characterized as population-level survival interactions.  Is that sufficient?
• Have I left open the possibility of land communities at different scales, and if not, 
is that a problem?
• How to characterize strength of interactions? (see Odenbaugh 2010 for one 
possibility; Post et al. 2007 also seem to have something in mind).
• How to address Eliot’s concern over the “(n + 1)th” problem for interaction 
accounts? (I’m not convinced it’s a problem.  Add an interacting population or 
subtract an interacting population and you still have a community; whether it is a 
healthy community is another story).
• Odenbaugh (2010) suggests that different ecosystem causal relations may specify 
different ecosystems; similarly, Eliot (2011, 2013) suggests that various interests 
(e.g., conservation, realism, prediction) determine different relevant causal 
interactions and pick out different communities.  Is this conflating ontology with 
modeling needs or pragmatic interests?  Does “circulates blood” pick out one 
organism and “circulates oxygen” another? 
• How to incorporate evolution into the land community concept?
• Can we go beyond food webs to consider biotic-abiotic “webs”?
12
